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In tro d u c tio n .
A potential game is a strategic game tha t allows a (potential) function on the set of 
strategy profiles such th a t potential differences under a unilateral deviation are the 
same as the differences in payoff for the deviating player. Therefore, the potential 
function can be used by deviating players as a leading principle in the sense tha t a 
profitable deviation increases the value of the potential function and, conversely, if 
the potential value increases under unilateral deviation, the deviation is profitable for 
the deviating player. This has two im portant consequences: an improvement process 
(a series of profitable unilateral deviations by various players) cannot cycle and a 
maximum of the potential function (if it exists) is automatically a Nash equilibrium. 
(Monderer and Shapley (1996)). For finite strategic games this means th a t a potential 
game has a pure Nash equilibrium and every (neatly defined) improvement process is 
finite.
In the theory of stochastic games one finds several subclasses th a t can be solved 
by considering and solving one or more—what we will call—finite auxiliary strategic 
games. The solution of the auxiliary game(s) leads to a solution of the stochastic
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game. Examples are the zero-sum games occurring in the Shapley equations for zero- 
sum two-person stochastic games (Shapley (1953)), non-zero-sum stochastic game 
with an ARAT-structure (Additive Rewards and Additive Transitions, Raghavan et 
al. (1985)) or a SER-SIT-structure (Separable Rewards and State Independent Tran­
sitions, Parthasarathy et al. (1984)).
In this paper we propose to investigate these classes of stochastic games and to see 
whether the existence of pure stationary equilibria (saddle points in the zero-sum case) 
can be derived from the existence of a potential function in the auxiliary game(s). 
The idea of using a pure stationary strategy is less problematic than the use of mixed 
actions in some states of the stochastic game.
Section 1 introduces the fundamental concepts in the theory of potential games (sub­
section 1.1) and the theory of ß -discounted two-person stochastic games (subsection 
1.2). Some of the results of the paper can be extended to n-person or undiscounted 
stochastic games but the paper focusses on ß -discounted two-person games.
Section 2 discusses the zero-sum case and shows tha t a zero-sum  ß-discounted two- 
person stochastic game has a saddle point if the auxiliary games occurring in the 
Shapley equation (Shapley (1953) have a potential function. Zero-sum A R A T  stochas­
tic games have these property but they form only a subset as we will show by an 
example.
Section 3 deals with non-zero-sum stochastic games. We consider the class of two- 
person stochastic games in which one player has additive rewards and the other player 
controls the transitions. These games are proved to have pure stationary equilibria. 
Another class we will investigate is formed by SER-SIT games (Parthasarathy et al. 
(1984)). Here we need an additional condition to find a potential function in the 
auxiliary game introduced by Parthasarathy et al. By an example we show tha t the 
(or at least an) additional condition is needed.
1. T h e  m o d els  a n d  th e  to o ls .
Subsection 1.1 contains the basic definitions in the theory of strategic games with a 
potential function and Section 1.2 recalls the basic facts about stochastic games (cf. 
the book of Filar and Vrieze (1996) for a comprehensive study of the subject).
1.1 S tra te g ic  G am es w ith  a  P o te n tia l  F u n c tio n .
Potential games are introduced in Monderer and Shapley (1996).
An n-person strategic game (A \, . . . ,  A n , u \ ,  .. ,u n) with (finite) action space Ai and
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n
utility function ui : A  =  A i ^  IR for each player i G N  is called a potential game if
i=1
there is a potential function F  : A  ^  IR such that, for all i G N , for all strategy profiles 
(ai)ieN G A  and every alternative action bi G A i , we have ui (bi , a- i ) — ui (a) =  
F  (bi, a -i)  — F  (a).
Here a- i  (a1, . . . ai—1, ai+1, . . . , an) and (bi , a- i ) (a1, . . . ai-1 , bi , ai+1, . . . , an)
Interesting properties of such a potential game are the existence of pure Nash equi­
libria (each element of argmax (F) is a Nash equilibrium) and the so called finite im­
provement property: starting from any strategy profile a Nash equilibrium is reached 
after a finite number of unilateral improvements by various players.
In the next proposition we give two characterizations for two-person zero-sum poten­
tial games. One characterization says that, for each 2 x 2-subgame, the sum of the 
payoffs in the diagonal and the anti-diagonal are the same. The other characterization 
says tha t the utility function for each player is the sum of a part only dependent on 
the player’s own action, and a part only dependent on the action of his opponent.
P ro p o s itio n  1. Given a strategic zero-sum game (A1,A 2, u 1,u 2) (u 1 +  u 2 =  0) 
the following assertions are equivalent:
(i) (A 1 ,A 2 ,u 1 , u )  is a potential game
(ii) (diagonal property) For all a 1 , b1 G A 1 and a2 , b2 G A 2 we have
u1(a1, a2) +  u1(b1, b2) =  u1(a1, b2) +  u1(b1, a2)
(iii) (separation property) There are functions gì. A1 ^  IR and g2 : A 2 ^  IR such 
that
u 1 (a1 , a2) =  g1(a1 ) +  g2 (a2 ) for all (a1 , a2) G A1 x A2.
P ro o f: (a) Monderer and Shapley (1996, Theorem 2.8) proved th a t (A 1,A 2, u 1,u 2) 
is a potential game if and only if, for all ai ,bi G A i , we have 
(u1(a1, a2) — u1(b1, a2)) +  (u2(b1, a2) — u2(b1, b2))+
(u1(b1, b2) — u1(a1, b2)) +  (u2(a1, b2) — u2(a1, a2)) =  0.
Substituting u2 =  —u 1 gives the equality
2 (u1(a1, a2) — 2 u 1(b1, a2)) — 2 u 1(a1, b2) +  2 u 1(b1, b2)) =  0. This is assertion (ii).
(b) We assume the diagonal property. Take two points of reference a\ G A 1 and 
a2 G A2 and define the functions g1 and g2 by g1(a1) :=  u 1(a1,a2 ) and g2(a2): =  
u1(a1 , a 2) — u ^ a ! ,a 2 ) . Then,
u1(a1, a2) =  (u1(a1, a2) — u1(aj, a2)) +  (u1(aj, a2) — u1(aj, a2)) +  u1(aj, a2) =  
(u1(a1,a2) +u1(a1 ,a2) — u ^ a j  ,a2)) +  g2(a2) =  g1(a1) +g2(a2) 
because of property (ii).
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(c) If u 1 is separable i.e., u 1(a1, a2) =  g1(a1) +  g2(a2) for certain functions gi : A i ^  IR 
(i =  1, 2), the diagonal property is easy to prove. <
R em ark : For non-zero-sum strategic games the diagonal property and the separa­
bility property are not needed for the existence of a potential function, as the bimatrix 
game with the following payoff matrices and potential function shows:
( X ,Y  ) = (1, 5) (1,0) (3, 10) (4, 6) and F  =
5 0 
7 3
Neither of the two payoff matrices has the diagonal property or the separability prop­
erty.
For bimatrix games the equivalence of the diagonal property and the separability 
property remains true and these properties are still sufficient for the existence of a 
potential function. Necessary is tha t the difference of the payoff matrices satisfies the 
diagonal property.
1.2 S to ch as tic  gam es w ith  p u re  N a sh  eq u ilib ria .
A two-person stochastic game is determined by the following data:
•  There is a finite set S  of states. Elements of S  are denoted by s , t , . . .
•  There are two players, I and II.
•  In each state s G S  each of the players has a finite set of actions : A l and A2.
•  There are two functions r 1 and r 2 (the reward functions) defined on the set
T : =  {(s, a 1, a2) : s G S, a1 G A 1 and a2 G A;:}.
•  There is a map p: T  ^  A (S ) (the set of probability vectors on S ). We write 
p(t | s, a 1, a2) for the t-th  coordinate of p(s, a 1,a 2). The map p  gives the Markov tran­
sition probabilities.
•  The game is played in a finite or countable sequence of stages. In each stage the 
players know what happened in the preceding stages and in particular the present 
state s and choose independently actions a 1 and a2 in their own action spaces A1 and 
A2. Their action choice can be based on all information they have at the moment 
they make their decision: the history of the game. An history has the following form:
(sc^ a2, s^  a1 a1, . . . , a l - ^  a n -^  sn).
The action choice results in an immediate reward to each of the players, r k (s, a 1,a 2) 
is the reward to player k  and the next stage the process is in state t  with probability 
p(t I s ,a 1, a 2). The history (past states and past actions) of the game is common 
knowledge between the players.
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By playing the game each of the players obtains a payoff every period and a stream 
of payoffs { rk(sn, alr,  a2n )}neN 0 results.
We assume tha t both players appreciate such a flow of rewards according to the utility
function U k ({rk (sn , aín , a2n )}neN 0 ) :=  T,nEN0 ßn ^  (sn ,a ^ , 02n ).
Here ß  G (0,1) is a fixed discount factor . If there are only finitely many stages (a 
stochastic game with finite horizon) the summation is taken over the finitely many 
stages.
A stochastic game is called zero-sum  if r 1 +  r 2 = 0  on T .
A Markov component for player k is a map f k : S  ^  U ses  A(Ak ) with the property 
f  k(s) G A (A k). So, a Markov component of player k determines a mixed action in Ak 
for each state s G S  and the action choice is only dependent on the present state, the 
last entry of a history. M C k denotes the (finite) set of Markov components of player 
k. A Markov strategy consists of a sequence of Markov components { fn } neNo, one 
for each stage n. If f ^  is the same for every stage, the strategy is called a stationary 
(Markov) strategy. If f^ (s )  is a pure action for every stage n  and every state s, the 
(Markov or stationary) strategy is called a pure strategy. We denote Markov strategies 
for player k by f k and the stationary strategy with f k =  f k for all n  by ( f k)TO. If 
Markov strategies (or more general history dependent strategies) f 1 and f 2 are chosen, 
a stochastic process determines the probabilities to be in stage sn a t time n  (as a 
function of the initial state sc) and the stream  of rewards {rk (sn , fn (sn ), fn (sn ))}n£No 
for both players. We define the payoff functions by
V f f U  :=  E  ß n r k (sn ,f1 (sn ),f2 (sn )) (k =  1, 2)
n£No
for all initial states sc G S .
Then we have a strategic game (dependent on the set of strategies we allow). Nash 
equilibria of this game are called the optimal (or equilibrium) solutions of the ß - 
discounted stochastic game.
For ß -discounted two-person zero-sum stochastic games we have the following funda­
mental result of Shapley (1953).
(i) Both players have a stationary optimal strategy. So, a ß-discounted two-person 
zero-sum stochastic games can be solved in stationary strategies.
(ii) To find optimal stationary strategies ( f  1)TO and ( f 2)œ and the value function 
vß : S  ^  IR defined by vß (s): =  Vg ( ( f  1)œ , ( f  2)œ ), a collection of auxiliary zero-sum 
games is considered.
For every state s and every vector x  G 1RS we define the finite zero-sum game r ( s, x) 
with action space A1 and A2 and payoff matrix
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[r1 (s ,a 1 ,a 2 )+ ß  £ tes  p (t \ s, a1 ,a2) x t]ai eAi 02eA2.
If a vector x  G IRs  satisfies the Shapley equations 
x s =  value (r(s , x)) for every s G S , 
then x  =  vg and optimal strategy profiles ( f  1( s ) , f 2(s)) in the auxiliary games 
r ( s ,  x  =  vg) determine a stationary optimal solution ( ( f  1)œ , ( f  2)œ ) of the stochastic 
game.
Also, non-zero-sum ß -discounted two-person stochastic games are solvable in station­
ary strategies. This result was proved by Fink (1964) and Takahashi (1964). Both 
authors used a fixed point argument.
If in a stochastic game the Markov strategies f 1 =  { fn } neiN0 and f 2 =  { fn } neNo are 
applied and x o G A (S ) gives the initial probability distribution over the states, the 
probability distribution xn over the states at time n  is given by the recursive formula
xn(t) =  E ses x n - 1 (s) p(t \ s, f ^  1 (s) , f l - 1 (s)) for all t G S.
If we introduce the S  x S -stochastic matrix
P ( f  1, f 2) by P ( f  1, f 2)s,t :=  p(t \ s , f  1( s ) , f 2(s)) for every pair of Markov compo­
nents f  1, f 2), the latter equation can be written as
xn =  xn- 1  p ( f n - 1 , f l - 1 ) for n  = 1 ,  2 , . . . .
The expected payoff in stage n, when ( f 1, f 2) is applied and the original distribution 
over the states is xo, equals
E s e s  x n (s) r(s, f n ( s )  f n (s)) =
=  E s e s  (xo p (f01, f o2) • • •p ( f L u  f ^ - 1 )s r(s,  f n (s), f ^ (s)).
If we define the S-vector R k( f  1, f 2) G IRs  by R k( f  1, f 2)s :=  r k ( s , f  1( s ) , f 2(s)) for 
every pair of Markov components ( f 1, f 2), we find for the expected payoff in period n
E s e s  xo(s) p  (fo1, fo2) • • • p  ( f n - 1, f2-1) R k( f n, f ) ) s  =
(xo, p ( f ,  fo2) • • • p  (f1-1,  f n - 1) R k (fn, f2)).
For stationary strategies the ß-discounted payoff vectors Vßk( ( f  1)œ , ( f  2)œ ) (k =  1, 2) 
equals
V k( ( f  1) ~ , ( f 2n  =  R k( f 1, f 2) +  ß p ( f 1, f 2) R k( f 1, f 2) +  ••• +
+ ß n-1 p ( f 1, f 2)n-1 R k( f 1, f 2) +  ••• =  [I -  ß p ( f 1, f 2)]-1 R k( f 1, f 2).
Notice tha t the matrix [I — ß  p  ( f  1, f 2)]-1 is a nonnegative m atrix for every pair of
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The main topic of this paper is to find conditions under which two-person ß -discounted 
stochastic games have pure stationary equilibria. In the literature there are several 
special classes of stochastic games tha t can be solved by using ‘auxiliary games’ of 
various nature. We will investigate for which classes the existence of pure station­
ary strategies can be derived from the fact tha t the auxiliary game has a potential 
function.
We will repeat the definition of the classes we will consider.
ARAT-games (Additive Rewards and Additive Transitions)
A two-person stochastic game is an ARAT-game if, for all s G S , all a 1 G A 1 and all 
a2 G A2,
r 1 (s, a 1,a 2) =  r 11 (s, a 1) +  r 12(s, a2), 
r 2(s, a 1, a2) =  r 21 (s, a 1) +  r 22(s, a2), 
p(t \ s, a1, a2) =  p 1(t \ s, a1) +  p 2(t \ s, a2) 
for some functions rij and p . So, the reward functions as well as the transition 
probabilities are sums of two functions, one only dependent on the state and the 
action of player I, the other only dependent on the state and the action of player II. 
If p 1 or p 2 is identically zero, we talk about single control games. If, for every element 
s G S  one of the transition functions p 1(s, a 1,a 2) or p2(s, a 1,a 2) vanishes, we call the 
stochastic game a stochastic game with switching control.
SER-SIT-games (Separable Rewards and State Independent Transitions)
In a SER-SIT stochastic game the actions spaces are the same in each state:
Ak =  Ak (=: A k) for s ,t  G S  and k =  1, 2.
A stochastic game is a SER-SIT-game if, for all states s G S , all a 1 G A 1 and all
a2 G A 2,
r 1 (s, a 1, a2) =  r 10 (s) +  r 11 (a1, a2) 
r 2(s, a 1, a2) =  r 2°(s) +  r 21 (a1, a2) 
p(t \ s, a 1, a2) =  p(t \ a 1, a 2) is not dependent on s.
So, the reward function is the sum of two parts, one only dependent on the present 
state and the other only dependent on the action profile. The transitions are not 
dependent on the present state.
If p(t \ s, a 1, a2) =  p(t \ s) is not dependent on the actions, we call the stochastic game 
a stochastic game with action independent transitions (AIT).
Markov components ( f 1, f 2).
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2. Z ero -su m  s to c h a s tic  gam es w ith  p u re  o p tim a l s ta t io n a ry  s tra te g ie s .
In this section we prove th a t two-person zero-sum ß -discounted stochastic games have 
a pure optimal stationary strategy if each of the auxiliary games r ( s ,  vg) (s G S) has 
a potential function. If all auxiliary games r ( s ,x )  (s G S, x  G IRs ) have a potential 
function, then the stochastic game is an ARAT-game. We provide an example showing 
that not every stochastic game of the first category is an ARAT-game.
L em m a 2. I f  the auxiliary games { r(s , vg)}ses  of a two-person zero-sum ß- 
discounted stochastic game have a potential function, then the stochastic game has an 
optimal stationary strategy in pure strategies.
P ro o f: By Monderer and Shapley (1996) every auxiliary game has a pure equilib­
rium and by Shapley (1953) these pure strategies form an optimal stationary strategy 
in the stochastic game. <
In the second lemma we prove th a t Lemma 2 can be applied to zero-sum ARAT- 
games.
L em m a 3. I f  a two-person zero-sum game is an ARAT-game, all auxiliary games 
r ( s ,  x) have a potential function and, conversely, i f  all auxiliary games r ( s ,x )  have 
a potential function, the stochastic game is an ARAT-game.
P ro o f: The payoff in any game r ( s ,  x) can be written as 
r 1(s, a 1, a2) +  ß  ^ tes  p(t \ s, a1, a2) xt =
[r11 (s,a1) +  ß  E t e s  p 1(t \ s,a1) x t] +  [r12(s ,a 2 )+ ß  E t e s  p 2(t \ s,a2) x t]. 
So, the zero-sum game r ( s ,  x) satisfies the separability property and, therefore, it 
admits a potential function by Proposition 1.
Conversely, if r (  s, x) for all s G S  and all x  G IRs , one can take x  =  0 and find by 
Proposition 1, tha t the rewards are additive: r 1(s, a 1, a2) =  r 11 (s, a 1) + r 12(s, a2). 
If we take any s ,t  G S  and x  =  et , the separation condition for the auxiliary game 
r ( s ,  et) gives r 11 (s, a 1) +  r 12(s, a2) +  ßp( t  \ s, a1, a2) =  f 11 (s, a 1) +  f 12(s, a2) for 
certain functions f  11 and f  12.
From this equation we can find the components
k r l k(s , ak) - r l k(s , ak) 
p ( t \ s , a )  = --------------- - --------------- . <
C oro llary . Two-person zero-sum ARAT-games have a pure optimal stationary 
strategy.
The next example shows tha t the ARAT-games do not exhaust the class of stochastic 
games where Lemma 2 applies.
E x am p le : Let S  =  {so, s^  s2, s3}. The states si =  so are absorbing states: both
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players have one action and the reward is r(si ) =  ui for i =  1, 2, 3. In state so both 
players have two actions and the rewards and transitions are given by
r 1 (so) u 1-U3
u 2
0 and p (so)








and for state so the auxiliary
r ( s o,vg ) :
wi ( - l  + î4â) w2(-l + j4g)
_U3 ( -  1 +  j 4 g ) ß vg  (so)
Then vg (so) =  0 solves the Shapley equations if 
ß ß
^ 3( — 1 +  ---- 3 ) > 0 and w2( — 1 +  ------- )  < 01 — ß  1 — ß
If we take u 1 =  u2 +  u3 we have the diagonal property. If ß  > 0.5 we must have 
u3 > 0, u 2 < 0 and u 1 =  u 2 +  u3. Clearly, the rewards are additive but the transitions 
are not
3. N o n -zero -su m  s to ch as tic  gam es w ith  eq u ilib ria  in  p u re  s tra te g ie s .
We start with two rather simple classes of non-zero-sum stochastic games with pure 
Nash equilibria. The first class is the class of coordination games. A n-person stochas­
tic game is a coordination game if all players have the same reward function . The 
second class is the class of stochastic games with action independent transitions in 
which all n-person games a =  (a1, . . .  an) ^  (r1(s, a) , . . . ,  rn (s, a)) have a potential 
function.
T h eo rem  4.
(i) I f  in an n-person stochastic game the reward functions are the same for all 
players, then the stochastic game has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
(ii) I f  an n-person stochastic game has action independent transitions (A IT) and 
for each state s G S  the finite n-person game with strategy sets {A *£}k=1 ,...,n and 
payoff functions a ^  {rk (s,a)}k= 1 ,..,n has a potential function, then the stochastic 
game has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
P roo f: (i) We prove that a Nash equilibrium is obtained by solving the following 
dynamical programming problem. The set of states S  is the same as in the stochastic 
game. The actions in state s G S  is As :=  n=1 As. Finally the reward functions 
and transition functions are also the same as in the stochastic game (although the 
interpretation is slightly different): f  =  r =  ri for all players i and p =  p. It is 
well known (see Blackwell (1962)) that dynamic programming problems have optimal
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stationary strategies in pure actions. Let f  : s G S  ^  f  (s) G A s be such an optimal 
strategy. If each player i chooses the i-th  component f i of f ,  this is a Nash equilibrium 
in the stochastic game. If any player deviates from his strategy in any stage of the 
game, his expected payoff cannot increase as the same deviation in the dynamical 
program would give the same increase of expected payoff.
(ii) If the players have no influence on the transitions, they will make the best out 
of the state they are. By the result of Shapley and Monderer there is a pure Nash 
equilibrium in each auxiliary game. That is, for each state s G S  there is a Nash 
equilibrium ( f  1( s ) , . . . ,  f n (s)) G nn= 1 A \ of the stage game. This defines a Markov 
component f i for each player i. Deviation of any player will not increase the payoff at 
any time in any state and has no influence on later expected payoffs. No player can 
gain by deviating at any time in any state. <
For non-zero-sum stochastic games the ARAT-structure is not sufficient for the ex­
istence of a pure stationary equilibrium (see Raghavan et al.(1985) and Raghavan 
Thuijsman (1997) for an example). Moreover, the auxiliary games as considered in 
the case of zero-sum games make little sense. If, however, the rewards for one player 
are additive and the transitions are single controlled by the other player, there are 
pure stationary equilibria.
T h e o re m  5. I f  in a non-zero-sum two-person stochastic game player I  has an 
additive reward function and the transitions are controlled by (the actions of) player
II, then there is a pure stationary equilibrium.
P ro o f: The additivity of the reward function of player I means that 
r 1( s ,a 1,a 2) =  r 11 ( s ,a 1) +  r 12(s, a2).
The single control says tha t p(t \ s ,a 1,a 2) =  p2(t \ s, a2).
As player I has no influence on the transitions it seems natural to assume that, in 
every state he will maximize the part of the reward r 11 (s, a 1) under his control.
So, we define a pure Markov component f o1 with the property that 
r 11(s, fo(s))  =  maxai e^i r 11(s, a 1).
If we fix f 1 player II will consider the dynamic decision problem with reward function 
f  : T 2: =  { (s ,a2) : s G S ,a 2 G A;:} ^  IR defined by f  (s, a2) :=  r 2(s, f ^ ( s ) , a2) and 
transition probabilities p  =  p 2: T 2 ^  A (S ) as before.
Dynamical Programming problems can be solved in pure stationary strategies. One 
solves first the Bellman equations :
x G lRs  : x s =  maxa2e 2^ [f(s, a2) +  ß  E  tes  p  (t \ s, a2) x t] 
and takes f 2(s) G A2 such that
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fo (s) G argm ax {a2 ^  [r (s, a2) +  ß  tes  p (t \ s ,a 2) xt]}.
Then ( f 2 )“  is a pure stationary strategy and a best response to ( f  )“ , because it is 
an optimal strategy in the dynamic program.
The pure stationary strategy ( f ) “  is a best response to every stationary strategy 
of player II. This follows from the formula Vg ( f ,  f 2) =  [I — ß  P  ( f  2)]-1 (R 11 (fo) +  
R 12( f 2)). If player I deviates from f  to f 1 all components of ñ 11( f 1) are less or 
equal to the components of R 11 ( f )  and as the m atrix [I — ß  P  ( f 2)]-1 > 0 also
[I — ß P ( f 2)]-1 ( ñ 11(fo1) — R 11( f 1) > 0.
The term  [I — ß P ( f 2)]-1 ( R12( f 2) does not change by a deviation of player I and 
( f 1)“  is a best response to every stationary strategy of player II. <
R em ark : In Nowak and Raghavan (1993) it is proved that, if the transitions are 
single control, a Nash equilibrium can be found by solving the following auxiliary 
bimatrix game. The strategy space of each player consists of the finite set of all 
Markov components { f ^ k e MCi  and {f¡2}ieMC2 .
If player I chooses the Markov component f  and player II chooses the Markov com­
ponent f 2 , the payoff to player I is ^ ses ñ 1(f1, f 2)s and the payoff to player II is 
^2ses Vß ( f l , f i )s.  If {Ck}keMC1 and {r¡i} l ^ M C 2 form a Nash equilibrium of the aux­
iliary game, the stationary strategies f° : =  £ keMCi £k fl, and f 2:=Y<ieMC2 ni fi 
defines an equilibrium in stationary strategies for the ß -discounted stochastic game. 
Therefore, the stochastic game has a pure stationary strategy, if the auxiliary bimatrix 
game has a pure Nash equilibrium.
If we have a SER-SIT-stochastic game and the bimatrix game [rk (s, a1, a2)]ai e^ i,a2e 2^ 
is a potential game for every state s G S , the ß-discounted stochastic game need not 
have a pure stationary equilibrium. We need an additional condition.
T h e o re m  6. I f  in a stochastic game with separable reward functions and state 
independent transitions
(i) the partial reward game [rk1(s, a 1,a 2)]ai e^i a2e 2^ has a potential function and
(ii) the matrix game Q: (a1, a2) ^  (p(a°, a2), r 1 o — r 2 o) has the diagonal property, 
then the stochastic game has an equilibrium in pure stationary strategies.
P ro o f: Parthasarathy et al. (1984) provides a method to solve SER-SIT stochastic 
games. It is sufficient to solve the auxiliary bimatrix game with strategy spaces A 1 
and A2 and payoff matrices [rk1 (a1, a2) +  ß  te sp ( t \ a1, a2) r ko(t)]ai£Ai,a2eA2. 
If (Ç,n) G A (A 1 ) X A(A2) is a Nash equilibrium of the auxiliary game, then the 
(even state independent) stationary strategy (£“ ,n “ ) is an equilibrium in the ß- 
discounted SER-SIT stochastic game. If the auxiliary game has a potential function,
11
the stochastic game has a pure stationary equilibrium.
Let F1: A 1 x A 2 be a potential function of the reward game [rk1 (a1,a 2)]ai e^i a2e^ 2. 
We have to prove tha t the bimatrix game [ß J2tEs p(t \ a1,a 2) r ko (t)] has a potential 
function. By Monderer and Shapley (1996) (Theorem 2.8) this is true if and only if 
the matrix
Q =  [ ß E t e s p(t \ a 1,a 2) ( r1 o(t) — r20(t))]aieA\a2eA2 has the diagonal property 
(see the proof of Proposition 1). <
E x am p le  The following example shows tha t the condition
Q: (a1, a2) ^  (p(a°, a2), r 10 — r 20) has the diagonal property, 
is not superfluous. Let S  =  {s1,s 2}. The action spaces A 1 and A2 consist of two 
actions.






p (s1 \ a 1, a2) : p (s2 \ a 1, a2): : (1 :0 )  (0 :1 )  (0.5 : 0.5) (0.5 : 0.5)
A potential function F 1 for [r ] and the function Q: (a1, a2) ^  ip(a , a2), r — r ) 
have the following values
F1(a1,a 2) = 0 0 1 0
4 —4 
0 0Q (a1,a 2) : 
property).
If we compute the auxiliary bimatrix game, we get the matrices:
(not satisfying the diagonal
'(1 ,0) (0, 0)' + ß '(3, —1) (—3,1)' —,ß,3+(1 (—3ß, ß)
.(2, 2) (0,1). . (0, 0) (0, 0) _ L (2,2) (0,1)
If ß  > g, the auxiliary game has only one completely mixed Nash equilibrium. 
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